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1. lNTROUUCTI UN 
The House of Lords decided in the Cds e of Pirelli General Cable Works 
Ltd v. Oscar Faber & Partners 1 that a cause of action in tort for 
negligence in the design or workmanship of a building accrued at the 
date when physical damage occurred to the building as a result of the 
defect, whether or not the damage could have been discovered with 
reasonable diligence at that date by the plaintiff . The object of 
this paper will be to examine the effect that this decision hai had on 
the previous conman law position. This will necessarily involve a 
discussion of the relevant English and New Zealand cases. Following 
this analysis, consideration will be given to the ways in which a 
court, seeking not to follow the Pirelli decision, might .distinguish 
Pirelli or otherwise sidestep the decision. It is submitted that 
application of the reasoning in Pirelli will undoubtedly lead to 
unjust results in future cases and thus as a matter of principle the 
New Zealand courts should attempt to find a way around that decision. 
A. Legislation 
The legislation which applies is the Limitation Act 1950. 
vant provision is found in S . 4(1) which provides that: 
The rele-
The following actions shall not · be brought after the 
expiration of six years from the date on which the cause 
of action accrued, that is to say:- (a) actions founded .· 
on simple contract or on tort ••• 
This provision is the same as S . 2(1) of the English Limitation Act 
1939. While this Act has now been repealed and replaced by the 
English Limitation Act 1980 the relevant provision remains substan-
tially unchanged. The other relevant section is S.28 of the New 
Zealand Limitation Act 1950 (S. 26 of the English Limitation Act 1980) 
which provides that in circumstances where fraud or mistake is 
involved: 
Di'.V (1BR!1RY 
V1f.r0RIA uw.-rns1TY Of WELUNGTC.~ 
, 
L 
the period of limitation shall not begin to run unt il 
the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or tne mistake , 
as the case may be, or could wit~ reasonable diligence 
have discovered it. 
Reference to "the Limitation Act" in the paper indicates that the 
passage is equally applicable to each of the New Zealand Limitation 
Act 1950, the English Limiation Act 1939 and the English Limitation 
Act 1960. 
B. The Decision in Pirelli 
The defendants in Pirelli were a firm of consulting engineers which 
negligently deiigned a chimney to be built at th~ plaintiffs' works. 
The chimney was built during June and July 1969. The trial judge 
decided that cracks must have occurred in the top of the chimney by 
April 1970. The writ was issued in October 1976. The judge found 
further that the defendants had not established that the plaintiffs 
ought, with reasonable diligence to have discovered the damage six 
years before the writ was issued. Thus on the basis of the earlier 
decision in Sparham-Souter v. Town & Country Developnents (Essex) Ltd 
2 it was held ~y the trial judge that the cause of action had accrued 
within the six year limitation period. 
The sole issue contested before the House of Lords was on the question 
of law as to the date at which a cause of action accrued. The result 
was that the cause of action accrued to the plaintiffs when cracks 
appeared in the top of the chimney . Therefore, the plaintiffs' cause 
of action was statute-barred as the writ had not been issued before 
April 1976. 
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C. General Principles 
The following principles relevant to a negligence action have now 
become indisputable: 
(1) In an action for damages for negligence there must be a tortious 
act corrrnitted by the defendant causing damage to be suffered by 
the plaintiff before a cause of action will accrue. 3 
(2) A cause of action accrues not at the date of the negligent act or 
omission but at the date when damage is sustained by the 
plaintiff. 4 
(3) A cause of action cannot accrue unless there is a person in 
existence capable of suing and another person in existence who can 
be sued. 5 
(4) Where an act is actionable only on proof of actual damage, suc-
cessive actions will lie for each successive and distinct accrual 
of damage. 6 
D. Area of Dispute 
Disputes most frequently arise when a latent defect exists in a 
building owned by the plaintiff. In ~ost cases the plaintiff is 
unaware of this defect until such time as the defect causes some 
observable structural damage. At this stage the plaintiff will sue 
the defendant who will set up as a defence S.4(1) (a) of the New 
Zealand Limitation Act 1950. The outcome will depend upon the selec-
tion of the date upon which damage occurred sufficient to give rise to 
the cause of action. In selecting this date the courts have had to 
consider the following questions: 
4 
(1) What damage is s ufficient for time to begin to run under the 
Limitation Act? 
(2) What is the relevance of the plaintiff's knowledge of the defect? 
(.3) Is the damage sufficiently distinct from earlier damage to give 
rise to a new cause of action? 
Of these the second has caused the most debate. 
II. THE ~NGLISH CASES 
A detailed examination of only three of the English cases decided 
prior to the decision in Pirelli will be made: 
( i) Cartledge v. E. Jopling! Sons Ltd 7 
(ii) Sparham-Souter v. Town! Country Developnents Essex Ltd B 
( iii) Anns v. Merton London Borough 9 
A. Cartledge v. }opling 
The plaintiffs were workmen who were employed as steel dressers in the 
defendants' factory. Due to the failure of the defendants to provide 
adequate ventilation, the workmen contracted pneumoconiosis which is a 
disease caused by the inhalation of noxious dust. The evidence 
established that those who were suffering from the disease would have 
suffered substantial injury before it could have been discovered by 
any means known to medical science. The workmen were unable to 
establish any breaches of statutory duty by the defendant company 
making any material contribution to their injuries in the six years 
prior to the- issue of their writs. In an attempt to get around a 
strict application of S.2(a) of the English Limitation Act 1939 coun-
sel for the plaintiffs advanced t ,hree main arguments: 
(1) injury to the workmen must be taken to have first occurred when 
the man first became aware of his disease since a man who does not 
feel any symptoms or have any knowledge of his physical disease 
has suffered no injury; 
(2) even if a cause of action accrued when the unknown injury was done 
to the lungs, a fresh cause of action accrued when the damage was 
s 
discovered ; 
(3) 1n cas e of injury by such insidious diseases as pneumoconiosis the 
courts should import into the words of the Limitation Act 1939 a 
gloss that the cause of action does not accrue, or time does not 
begin to run , until such time as the plaintiff knows, or ought to 
have known , that he has suffered injury . 
The House of Lords unanimously rejected the plaintiffs ' arguments and 
held that their claims were statute- barred . 
In rejecting counsel's first argument Lord Pearce observed that : 
And in no case is it laid down that hidden physical injury 
of which a man is ignorant cannot, by reason of his 
ignorance, constitute damage. 10 
Acceptance of counsel's second argument would, according to· Lord 
Pearce, have entailed acceptance of the proposition ~hat a fre5h cause 
of action accrued as soon as the results of the x-ray photographs 
became known. Lord Pearce ·rejected this submission as absurd. 
The most significant aspect of the decision was the unanimous 
agreement aroongst the Law Lords that they were unable to read into the 
words of S . 2(a) the gloss for which counsel had contended . The 
reason for this was the plain implication to be drawn from S. 26 of the 
Act . That section expressly states that in cases involving fraud the 
state of the plaintiff's knowledge concerning his available cause of 
action affects the date of accrual of the cause of action . Section 
2(a) however makes no provision for the state of the plaintiff ' s 
knowledge to be taken into account. Thus it was decided that it 
would be contrary to the intention of Parliament to make the 
plaintiff's knowledge a relevant consideration when determining the 
date of the accrual of a cause of action under S.2(a) . 
7 
It should be not ed t hat in n:ljecting counsel's arguments the House of' 
Lords did not rely on the particular facts of the case . Neither the 
fact that the damage for which damages were claimed was personal 
injury, nor the fact that the damage was caused by the disease pneumo-
coniosis, was influential in denying the plaintiffs a remedy. 
Each of the Law Lords in fact expressed a personal dissatisfaction 
with the state of law in view of .its denial of a remedy to the' plain-
tiffs in Cartledge . Lord Pearce in particular called for Parliament 
to rectify this situation . 
year the Limitation Act 1963~ 
B. The Limitation Act 1963 
Parliament did so by passing later that 
Lord Fraser in Pirelli sumned up the effect of this Act as follo\.vS: 
It extended the time limit for raising of actions for damages 
where material facts of a decisive character were outside the 
knowledge of the plaintiff until after the action would nor-
mally have been time-barred, but it applied only to actions 
for damages consisting of or including personal injuries. 11 
Counsel have used this Act t9 develop an argument that the English 
Parliament intended to leave the law in respect of negligent damage to 
property uQchanged from the position as it was laid down in Cartledge 
v .• Jopling . The argument was that the Limitation Act 1963 made the 
state of the plaintiff's knowledge regarding the damage he had suf-
fered a relevant consideration only where the damage was in the nature 
of personal injury . The 1963 Act was not concerned with damage in 
which personal injury was not involved. Thus the implication to be 
drawn is that Parliament deliberately left the law unchanged in 
respect of property damage. 
No corr-esponding amendment has been made to the N. Z. !_imitation Act 
1950. Reference to the significance of this fact will be made later 
in this paper 12 but one point requires mention at this stage. In 
N.Z. no claims may be brought for compensatory damages for personal 
injury in a negligence action by virtue of S.5(1) of the Accident 
Compensation Act 1972. 
C. Sparhan-Souter v. Town Develop:nents 
This was an action brought by the plaintiffs who were the owners of 
two houses which had become uninhabitable. The first defendants were 
the developers of a new housing estate in Essex . 
dants were the local council. 
The second defen-
The Court of Appeal was asked to decide .a preliminary issue expressed 
in the order of the trial judge as follows: 'Whether the plaintiffs' 
cause of action was brought within six years from the date on which 
the cause of action accrued.' 
The relevant facts of the case were as follows: in October 1964 the 
council granted planning permission to the developers and passed the 
developers' plans subject to the builders complying with the building 
by-laws. In May 1965 work was started on the two houses. In 
December 1965 the Council certified the legality of the work carried 
out under the building by-laws. In November 1965 and January 1966 
the conveyances were completed to the purchasers. Two or three years 
later several cracks appeared in the brickwork of the houses and they 
eventually became uninhabitable. The alleged cause of this damage 
was that the foundations were inadequate to support the houses. The 
plaintiffs alleged that this was due to, firstly, the negligent 
g 
construction of the builders and secondly, tile negligence of the coun-
cil inspector in passing the work as satisfactory when he ought not to 
have done so. In October 1972 the plaintiffs issued a writ for 
damages. 
There are three aspects of the decision which I wish to examine: 
(1) When damage occurred 
(2) When the cause of action accrued 
(3) The assignability of causes of action 
( 1 ) Damage 
The area of enquiry under this heading can be divided into two 
questions: 
(i) What is meant by "damage" in the context of the principle 
that a cause of action accrues not at the date of the negli-
gent act or omission but at the date when damage is sustained 
by the plaintiff? 
(ii) When does this damage first occur? 
Let us consider the first of the above ·questions . The damage 
which the plaintiffs in SparhcJTI-Souter alleged that they had suf-
fered was the diminution in the value of the houses and/or the 
cost of repairing the defects which had become apparent . Lord 
Denning did not regard the purchasers of a house with defective 
foundations as having suffered damage simply due to the fact that 
the house they had bought had such a defect . Roskill and 
Geoffrey Lane LJJ agreed with Lord Oenning's view that the purcha-
10 
sers rnight resell the house at a full price and consequently 
suffer no damage. 
All the judges agreed also upon when it was that damage occurred -
"when the faults emerged", 13 "when the defective state of the 
property first appeared" 14 or "when the house sank and the cracks 
appeared" 15 
It should be noted that in answering the question : 'has damage 
been suffered?' - the focus is not upon when the building suffers 
damage but when the plaintiff suffers damage. This point was 
made expressly by Geoffrey Lane LJ while comnenting upon the deci-
sion of Mars-Jones Jin Higgins v. Arfen Borough Council 16 when 
he (Geoffrey Lane LJ) says: 
It seems to me that he [Mars-Jones J] fails to 
distinguish between damage to the building and 
damage to the plaintiff. (my emphasis) 17 
This approach is comnon to both of the other judgments. 
Thus, all three judges in Sparham-Souter agreed upon the following 
points : 
(1) that the mere existence of a defect does not cons~tute 
damage . The reason is that the house may be resold at no 
financial loss . 
(2) damage will be said to have occurred when the defective state 
-tJ 
of~property appears. 
(3) the question of whether damage has occurred is to be framed 
in terms of: 'Has the plaintiff suffered damage?' 
11 
(ii) When does tne damage first occur? 80th Roskill and Geoffrey 
Lane LJJ agreed that the earliest mornent at which a plaintiff in 
the position of a first (or subsequent purchaser ) could be said to 
have suffered damage was when he acquired an interest in the 
defective property. Both judges stressed that it was not 
necessarily at this date that the plaintiff suffered damage 
because the defects may only manifest themselves later. 
Both Lord Denning and Geoffrey Lane LJ determined the date on 
which damage was suffered by the plaintiffs in Sparham-Souter dif-
ferently from the manner in which the same date was determined in 
Cartledge v. ' Jopling. 
Lord Denning simply asserted that in Cartledge v. Jopling 
the damage to the man was in fact done when the dust 
was inhaled - even though it was not discovered till 
later. Here there was no damage to any purchaser of 
the house until it began to sink and cracks appeared. 18 
Geoffrey Lane LJ agreed with these corrrnents of Lord Denning and 
added that the feature distinguishing a case of unobservable phy-
sical injury from a case of an unobservable defect in a house was 
that in the latter case the plaintiff could get rid of his house 
before any damage was suffered, while in the former case the 
plaintiff could not get rid of his body before it could be said 
that he had suffered damage . 
(2) When the Cause of Action Accrues 
Lord Denning and Geoffrey Lane LJ both saw the plaintiff's 
knowledge of the damage as a relevant consideration in determining 
when the cause of action accrued. Roskill LJ however made no 
12 
reference to this point. It wi 11 be sufficient to stale tne 
conclusion of Lord Denning only as the conclusion reached by 
Geoffrey Lane LJ was substantially the sane. 
expressed his conclusion as follows: 
Lord Denning 
I have come to the conclusion that when building work is 
badly done - and covered up - the cause of action does 
not accrue, and time does not begin to run, until such 
time as the plaintiff discovers that it has done damage, 
or ought, with reasonable diligence, to have discovered 
it. 19 
This conclusion is clear and does not require elucidation but the 
question.which must be asked is how it relates to the decision of 
the House of Lords in Cartledge v. Jopling. 
It has already been noted that Cartledge v. Jopling held that the 
state of the plaintiff's knowledge concerning the damage suffered 
by' him could not affect the date on which the cause of action 
accrued due to the plain implications to be drawn from S.26 of the 
J 
English Limitation Act 1969. On the other hand in Sparham-Souter 
it was held by 2 of the 3 merroers of the court that the cause of 
action would not accrue until the plaintiff knew or ought to have 
known that he had a cause of action. 
In reaching this result neither Lord Denning nor Geoffrey Lane LJ 
referred to the contextu91 argument upon which the House of Lords 
in Cartledge reached ·its conclusion on this point. Nevertheless 
both judges (as did Roskill LJ) quoted the passage in Lord Reid's 
speech in Cartledge where he conmented upon the harshness and 
unreasonableness of the result that the Law Lords felt forced to 
reach. The conclusion to which one is inevitably drawn is that 
the Court of Appeal was making a covert departure from the deci-
13 
sion in Cartledge . This mi ght explain why no reference was 1nada 
to the contextual argument advanced in Cartledge. Distinguishing 
Cartledge from Sparharn-Souter on its facts would not affect t he 
binding nature of this contextual argument because the argument 
proceeded independently from the particular facts of the case . 
(3) Assignment of t he Cause of Action 
Lord Denning and Roskill LJ expressed apparently contradictory 
views on this point . Lord Denning's view was that: 
the only owner who has a cause of action is the owner 
in whose time the damage appears . He alone can sue for 
it unless, of course, he sells the hous e with its 
defects and assigns the cause of action to his 
purchaser . 20 
Roskill LJ advanced the following opinion: 
There is no assignment of any pre-existing cause of 
action in tort in the plaintiffs' favour from their pre-
decessors in title. Nor do I understand how, as this 
argument presupposed, there can be some inchoate or 
floating cause of action in tort existing in vacua which 
can suddenly enure to the plaintiff's benefit upon their 
acquisition of a legal or equitable title to the pro-
perty in question . Furthermore , the present plaintiffs 
have clearly not acquired such a benefit by contract or 
by statute, and I fail to see upon what principle ~hey 
can be said to have acquired it by operation of law. 21 
Thus , Lord Denning suggested that a cause of action in tort is 
assignable whereas Roskill LJ clearly rejected the argument that 
the cause of action came with the property . Can the views be 
reconciled? Roskill LJ implies that a cause of action in tort 
may be acquired by contract but clearly the contract must be more 
than a simple contract for the sale of the property , as the cause 
of action in Sparham-Souter, according to Roskill LJ, did not 
14 
simply co,ne wit'l the property. Lord Denning however' does not 
express ly indicate what, if anything, besides tne sale of t he 
house is required to assign the cause of action. 
The problem of whether the plaintiffs in Sparham-Souter were in 
fact assigned their causes of action did not arise on the facts of 
the case . The plaintiffs were the original purchasers of the 
house so it was difficult to envisage exactly how a cause ,of 
action in respect of the damage they suffered could have accrued 
prior to their purchase . 
The question of assignment of the cause of action is however an 
important one. If, as Lord Denning indicates , an owner can sue 
only for that damage which occurs during his ownership , a valid 
assignment of the cause of action to a successive owher would pro-
vide an exception to this rule . If a cause of action does not 
simply come with the property, what more is required? The answer 
does not appear from the judgments in Sparham-Souter but Roskill 
LJ does not imply that a cause of action may be assignable by 
contract . 
One additional point requires mention at this stage . It has 
already bee~ noted that Geoffrey Lane and Roskill LJJ decided that 
the e9rliest moment at which a plaintiff i n the position of a 
first or subsequent purchaser could be said to suffer damage was 
when _he acquired an interest in the defective property . Consider 
the situation where damage occurs in 1980 during the ownership of 
A, who without suing the negligent builder, sells to 8 in 1985 . 
If 8 sues the builder between 1986 and 1991 will she be precluded 
from recovering damages by S . 4(1) of the N.Z . Limitation Act 1950? 
15 
Applying the approach of Rosk ill LJ (and Geoffrey Lane LJJ in 
Sparham-Souter the answer will be that~ will not be precluded by 
the Limitation Act. The reasoning would be that while a cause of 
action accrued to A in 1980, six years had not run before the 
house was sold to B. A's cause of action is not assignable to B 
and as the earliest moment at which B suffered damage was in 1985, 
B's cause of action cannot be statute-barred before 1991. Would 
Lord Oenning's approach lead to the same result? There are 
apparently two possible answers. A's cause of action was 
assigned to B, and thus B's cause of action would be statute-
barred after 1986. Alternatively, B's cause of action does not 
accrue until she discovers the damage, or, ·ought with reasonable 
diligence to have discovered it. On this basis B's cause of 
action did not accrue before 1985. Probably Lord Denning would 
prefer the second alternative because he was obviously intent upon 
avoiding a result which would render a plaintiff's cause of action 
·statute-barred before the plaintiff was even aware that he had a 
cause of action. 
D. Anns v. Merton London Borough 22 
This was another case of damage to a building caused by a · latent 
defect. The plaintiffs were lessees of flats in a two storey block 
which had been constructed upon inadequate foundations. 
The block was completed in 1962 following which long leases were 
granted. In 1970 structural movements began to occur in the building 
and these resulted in cracks in the walls and sloping of floors. The 
defendants were the local council . The major issue in the case was 
whether the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs, and the limita-
tion question was dealt with only briefly. 
Lord Wilberforce, with whorn 3 other members of tr1e court concurred, 
agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sparham-Souter at 
least in as far as ••• 
it abjured the view that the cause of action arose 
imnediately upon delivery, i.e., conveyance of the 
defective house. 22 
Clearly then an original purchaser's cause of action could not accrue 
before he .acquired . an interest in the house. It is also evident that 
Lord Wilberforce agreed that the plaintiff would not suffer damage due 
simply to the fact that the house he had bought had a latent defect. 
Lord Wilberforce, observed further that the cause of action -
can only arise when the state of the building is such that 
there is present or imninent danger to the health or safety 
of persons occupying it. 23 
It is clear that the damage which had to be present before the cause 
of action would accrue was related to the statutory duty which the 
defendant council had to perform under the Public Health Act 1936. 
Thus the mere appearance of cracks would not be sufficient damage to 
give rise to a cause of action against the council unless the cracks 
were, or should have been, indicative of some danger to the health or 
safety of the inhabitants . 
The inference which may be drawn from this is that according to Lord 
Wilberforce the damage which has to be present before the cause of 
action will accrue must be indicative of the duty which has been 
breached. 
The Court of Appeal in .Sparhan-Souter agreed that damage occurred when 
the defective state of the property appeared. There was no require-
ment that the damage had to indicate the nature of the duty which the 
17 
second defendants (the local council) had breached before t he darnage 
would be sufficient to give rise to a cause of action. Lord 
Wilberforce's standard for the damage which must be present before the 
cause of action may accrue is therefore more favourable to the plain-
tiff, at least in theory, than the standard set by the Court of 
Appeal. In practice however once damage manifests itself, if it is 
sufficient to indicate the defective state of the property it will 
also indicate a breach of duty. 
Lord Salrnon in Anns was also content to follow the decision in 
Sparhan-Souter that the cause of action in negligence accrued as soon 
as damage was sustained as a result of the negligence. He did indi-
cate however, that the cause of action might accrue before the damage 
was detected but stated that: 
since in fact no. damage manifested itself until February 
1970 it may be very difficult to prove that damage had 
in fact occurred four years previously. 24 
Clearly then Lord Salrnon thought that something more than the 
existence of a defect was necessary before the cause of action could 
accrue. Lord Salmon agreed with Lord Wilberforce that the damage had 
to be such as to endanger the safety of its occ~pants or visitors, 
before .the cause of action would accrue. 
Neither Lord Wilberforce nor Lo·rd Sa lrnon ref erred to the view advanced 
by Lord Denning and Geoffrey Lane LJ that the cause of action could 
not accrue before the plaintiff knew, or ought to have known of the 
existence of the damage. Lord Salmon did observe however that damage 
could have occurred four years before it was detected1 and in spite of 
the fact that the damage was undetected the statute could still begin 
to run from the date of the damage. Clearly this is incompatible 
1b 
with what was said in Sparham-Souter as there it was held that the 
plaintiff's knowledge of the damage could affect the date on which the 
cause of action accrued. 
Thus it is unlikely that the House of Lords in Anns adopted the whole 
of the reasoning in Sparham-Souter as being sound and good law. It 
adopted at least part of the reasoning but it is submitted that the 
.House of Lords did not adopt the Court of Appeal's decision in 
Sparham-Souter that the cause of action cannot accrue before the 
plaintiff knows, or ought to know of, the existence of the damage. 
E. Sunmary , of the English Position Prior to Pirelli 
The House of Lords in Cartledge v. Jopling had reluctantly decided 
that the plaintiff~s knowledge of the damage which he had suffered 
could not affect the date on which the cause of action accrued. To 
allow the plaintiff's knowledge to be a relevant consideration under 
S.2(a) of the English Limitation Act 1939 would be contrary to the 
rules of statutory interpretation rjue to the plain implications to be 
drawn from S.26 of the same Act. 
The Court of Appeal in Sparham-Souter covertly departed from the deci-
sion of the House of Lords in Cartledge and made it easier ·for a 
plaintiff to succeed on the limitation issue. Firstly, the plaintiff 
could not be said to have suffered damage before he acquired an 
interest in the property. Secondly, damage could not occur before 
the defective state of the property appeared. Thirdly, the 
plaintiff's cause of action would not accrue until the plaintiff was, 
or ought to have been, aware of the damage. 
The decision in Sparham-Souter was followed in subsequent cases and 
its reasoning was partly adopted by the House of Lords in Anns while 
19 
d ea l i ng wi th t he l imitation ques ti on as a s econdary i3s ue . 
The effect of the Court of Appeal's decision was t hat a cause of 
action might be pos tponed indefinitely but t hi s was s een as pr eferab l e 
to the alternative which was that a plaintiff's cause of act i on mi ght 
be ~tatute-barred even before he was aware that he had a cause of 
action. There were however problems with the Sparham-Souter 
approach . How could a subsequent purchaser bring a claim on the 
basis of damage which had occurred during the ownership of his prede-
cessor in title , if that subsequent damage was not distinct from the 
earlier ·damage? Only Lord Denning was p~epared to hold that the 
cause of action was assignable. This is however contrary to t he 
general rule that a cause of action in tort is not ass i gnable • . 25 
Lord Wilberforce in Anns offered an alternative formulation of t he 
type of damage which had to be present before t he cause of action 
could accrue. The damage had to be such that t here was present or 
imninent da~er to the health or safety of the occupants . Clearly 
the damage which had to be present was related to the s t atutory duty 
which the defendant council was bound to discharge. Under this for-
mulation it was possible that the date on which it could be said that 
damage had occurred .sufficient for time to begin to run under the 
Limitation .Act could be later than the date on which the defective 
state of the property appeared . 
There was no support in Anns for the argument t hat t he cause of action 
could not accrue before the discoverability dat e - that i s when the 
plaintiff was, or ought to have been aware of the damage . 
20 
II I . fH E NEW ZEALAND POSI TI UN 
There are two decisions of the Court of Appeal which require examina-
tion: Bowen v. Paramount Builders 26 and Johnson v. Mt. Albert 
Borough 27 
A. Bowen v. Paramount Builders 
This was an action brought by the owner of a house against the 
builders who also brought a Mr McKay , the original owner of the house, 
into the proceedings as a third party . The house had been built on a 
sub-foundation of peat for which inadequate foundations were used . 
When the construction was nearing completion Mr McKay noticed that 
some bricks had cracked in one of the exterior side walls . There was 
· also evidence of further defects in the house : (i) t he ridge of t he 
roof had dropped about 11.z an inch at its midd le point; (ii) there was a 
fall of approximately 21/.z inches at the centre dividing internal wall. 
The builders erected a carport to cover up the cracks in the s i de 
wall. McKay was however unhappy with the state of the flats and 
before completion sold them to the plaintiffs . The plaintiffs took 
possession in June 1969 . Within three or four months doors started 
jarnning but it was not until early in 1970 that the plaintiffs 
.realised that something was seriously wrong. Late in 1970 the writs 
were issued. 
The limitation question was discussed by one member only of the Court 
of Appeal as the major issues in the case concerned questions of duty 
and breach . Richmond P stated that: 
I accept the view arrived at in Sparham-Souter v . Town 
and Country Developnents (Essex) Ltd that, in a situation 
like the pres ent, the damage does not occur at the time 
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when t he builder negligently erects a house on inadequat 8 
foundations and sub-foundations . It occurs when t l1e 
negligence of the builder res ults in actual structura l 
damage to the building which is more than minimal . ~8 
How much of the Sparha:n-Souter reas oning does Richmond P actually 
adopt? Clearly he agrees that the mere existence of the defect does 
not mean that damage has occurred . Richmond Prefers to "actual 
structural damage " as the requisite damage to give rise to the cause 
of action . This fonnulation appears to be consistent with the view 
of the English Court of Appeal that there has to be some manifestation 
of the defect before it may be said that the plaintiff has suffered 
damage . 
No r eference is made by Richmond P to the argument adopted by Lord 
Denning and Geoffrey Lane LJ that the plaintiff's cause of action 
would not accrue until he was , or ought to have been, aware of t he 
damage . Richmond P did however advance his opinion concerning the 
relevance of the plaintiff's knowledge : 
There may be difficulty in accepting the mere discovery 
of a latent defect as itself amounting to damage. If, 
however , a purchaser by some means discovered the defect 
after he had purchased the building then it would seem 
reasonable that he should at least be able to sue for 
the cast of repairs actually incurred to prevent 
threatened damage . 29 
It is important to note that the emphasis is on the plaintiff ' s 
knowiedge of the defect rather than the plaintiff ' s knowledge of the 
damage . According to Richmond P knowledge of the defect will not 
result in the accrual of the cause of action as damage (a component 
part of the cause of action) has not occurred. In s pite of this, in 
his view, the plaintiff will be able to sue to recover the cost of 
repairs actually incurred in preventing the threatened damage . This 
seems anomalous as it seems that a plaintiff will be able to recover 
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danages even before the cause of action has accrued . Perl1aps there 
is no anornaly if the rnoney actually spent in preventing the threatened 
damage can be regarded as the damage necessary to cornplete the corn-
ponent parts of the plaintiff's cause of action. 
The anomaly does arise from the judg~ent of Woodhouse J when he indi-
cates that if a defect is discovered then the owner should be able to 
claim the sum needed to repair it "before the reparatory work is 
carried out" . 3D There is a compelling policy reason to allow this 
result - an owner may find it financially impossible to effect the 
repairs without first obtaining the cost ·from the builder . The di f-
ficulty however is that allowing an owner to recover damages from a 
negligent builder before damage has been suffered would permit the 
owner to succeed in a cause of action lacking a component part 
(damage) of his cause of action. 
The view of Cooke Jon this point seems to be preferable to that of 
Woodhouse J. Cooke J preferred the view that once damage had been 
suffered the owner ought to be able to recover the cost of reasonably 
necessary remedial work whether already incurred or about to be 
incurred . 31 There is no difficulty involved in allowing the recovery 
of this future expense when damage has already occurred . 
There is no indication in any of the judgrnents · that the date of 
accrual of the cause of action would be delayed until the plaintiff 
was, or ought to have been, aware of the damage. On the other hand 
there is no rejection of the conclusion arrived at in Sparham-Souter. 
1. Causation 
Woodhouse J indicated that the state of the plaintiff's knowledge 
of the defect might be relevant in another way. He remarked 
that: 
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••• a purchaser who had such knowledge [of the defect] 
or a purchaser who ought reasonably to have obtained 
that knowledge by inspection could scarcely suggest 
that the builder was responsible for the trouble he 
had really brought upon himself. 32 
Thus where a purchaser fails to discover the defect, when it could 
reasonably be expected that he would discover the defect, his 
claim will be defeated upon proof by the defendant that ihis 
failure broke the chain of causation. 
- Richmond Palso indicated that an intermediate examination by a 
purchaser might break the chain of causation and prevent the 
purchaser from subsequently recovering damages from the builder. 
The reason for the rule against assignment of tort actions is the 
prevention of causes of action from becoming a marketable corn-
modity. 32A The rule could be replaced by this intermediate exa-
mination doctrine, as once it is proved that the purchaser had 
knowledge of the defect the chain of causation would be broken as 
the effective cause of the purchaser's loss would be his purchase 
of the house knowing of the defect. 
2. Classification of the Damage 
Richmond P concluded that: 
In the present case the evidence shows that substantial 
damage occurred after the Bowens had purchased the 
building. It does not however, establish that more than 
minimal damage had occurred before they purchased. 
In those circumstances no question can arise as to the 
cause of action against Paramount having arisen prior to 
their purchase ••• (my emphasis) 33 
It has already been noted that the evidence established that the 
following damage had occurred prior to the Bowens ' purchase of the 
[!, ,7 LIBRARY 
\'tUORIA lHHVtRSi fY Of Wfl I lNGT(,r. 
24 
house: (i) sane bricks had cracked in one of the exterior side 
walls; (ii) the ridge of the roof had dropped about 11.z an inch at 
its middle point, (iii) there was a fall of approximately 21~ 
inches at the centre dividing internal wall. In spite of the 
existence of this damage, in particular the cracks in -one of the 
exterior walls which were covered up by a carport, Richmond P was 
willing to classify the damage as insufficient for the cause of 
action to accrue. Arguably Richmond P was concerned that if he 
decided that more than minimal damage had occurred prior to the 
purchase of the house the plaintiffs would not have .been able to 
establish a valid cause of action. 
One way in which the harsh result which may be involved in deter-
mining when a cause of action has accrued, may be avoided is by 
classifying .damage as either minimal or substantial. Clearly the 
damage which occurred prior to the Bowens' purchase fell outside 
the operation of the pfinciple of de minimis non curat lex. 34 
In subsequent cases the classification of damage as "minimal" and 
thus insufficient to give rise to a cause of actton, may be used 
to reach a fair result by effectively postponing the date of 
accrual of the action to enabls the plaintiff to succeed (if this 
would in fact be a ju_st result). 
Neither Woodhouse J nor Cooke j discussed the distinction drawn by 
Richmond P. Cooke J was prepared to hold however that the damage 
to the building was not continuous and that there was "a difference 
and an interval marked enough to justify treating the latter 
damage as distinct". 35 This statement was preceded by reference 
to the principle that where there is more than one instance of 
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damage, successive actions will only be possible when the later 
damage is distinct from the earlier damage. 
Thus Bowen offers two alternatives to a plaintiff who is 
confronted by the statutory limitation of his cause of action. 
He may argue firstly that the initial manifestation of the defect 
was "minimal damage only and therefore insufficient to give rise 
to the cause of action" . Alternatively, if the earlier damage 
was substantial it could be argued that the later damage was 
distinct from the earlier damage and gave rise to a new cause of 
action. Cooke J indicated that the determination of whether 
later damage was distinct from earlier damage was "a question of 
fact and degree". 36 Presumably also the classification of 
damage into minimal and substantial must also be a question Gf 
fact and degree. A fact and degree test provides the Court with 
a flexible tool with which to reach equitable results. 
B. Mt Albert Borough v . Johnson 
· A building had been erected by Sydney (the second defendants) on land 
which was known to have been filled . The Council (the first 
defendants ) inspected the foundations before the concrete was poured . 
In 1967 cracks _appeared in the front concrete steps , the outside 
roughcast plaster and also in the ceiling of the lounge . Remedial 
work not going to the root of the problem (subsidence) was carried 
out. In 1970 the plaintiff bought the house. The condition of the 
house at this stage was "iITTTlaculate" . Towards the end of 1970 slight 
-cracks began to appear . These cracks became significantly worse and 
the general condition of the house deteriorated. The cracking which 
appeared in 1970 corresponded to some extent with the cracking in 1967 
but the later cracking was significantly worse and more extensiv~. 
In 1973 the plaintiff issued the wri t . 
The outcome depended mainly upon whether the damage which occurred in 
1970 could be regarded as distinct from the damage which occurred in 
1967 . The response of Cooke and Somers JJ, with whom Richardson J 
agreed on this point, was that the damage which occurred in 1970 was 
sufficiently distinct from the earlier damage ~ogive rise to.a new 
cause of action . As the judges indicated, the determination of 
whether damage is sufficiently distinct to result in a separate cause 
of action is a question of fact and degree. However, the followirig 
factors were considered as significant: (i) there was no evidence of 
further subsidence between 1967 and 1970; (ii) there was an interval 
between the initial and subsequent damage; (ii) the damage which 
occurred in 1970 was more serious than the earlier damage. 
Thus .the possibility for categorisation of damage as distinct from 
earlier damage suggested by Cooke Jin Bowen was repeated by the same 
judge in conjuction with Somers Jin Johnson to ensure that the plain-
tiff was not denied a remedy by virtue of the fact that the original 
damage had not occurred during the course of her ownership . 
The dicta of the Court of Appeal must also be considered . 
Somers JJ observed that : 
Such a cause of action must arise, we think, either 
when the damage occurs or when the defect becomes 
apparent or manifest . The latter appears to be the 
more reasonable solution. 37 
Cooke and 
Cited as authority for this statement were, inter alia, Lord Reid in 
Cartledge v. Japing, Lord Wilberforce in Anns and Geoffrey Lane LJ in 
Sparham-Souter . On the basis of the above statement it is submitted 
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tndt it is unlikely that the New Zealand Court of Appea l would hold 
that a cause of action accrued while damage was unable to be detected. 
The reason is that the words "apparent or manifest" indicate that the 
darnage must be detectable before the cause of action will accrue. On 
the other hand the fact that the damage did go undetected would not 
prevent the cause of action from accruing if the damage were detec-
table . The reason is that in neither of the judgments in Johnson is 
approval given to the decision in Sparham-Souter that a cause of 
action could not accrue before the damage was, or ought to have been 
detected . 
1. Assignment of the Cause of Action 
All the mBTJbers of the Court of Appeal agreed that Miss Johnson 
could sue only for damage which had occurred during her ownership 
as there was in this case no assignment of the cause of action to 
the plaintiff. It must be remembered that it was not argued for 
the plaintiff that any cause of action was assigned to her because 
a claim for the 1967 damage was already time-barred. Richardson J 
expressed his opinion as follows: 
And, except where an existing right of action is assigned . 
to a purchaser, he can sue ·only in respect of damage which 
occurs during the period of his ownership or occupation . 38 
There are two possible interpretations of these statements made by 
the Court of Appeal . Firstly this situation is not one which pro-
vides an exception to the general rule that a cause of action is 
not assignable . Secondly, the cause of action was here 
assignable but was in fact not assigned . The second alternative 
offends the basic rule that causes of action are not assignable 
and there is little authority to support such an exception . But 
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the latter explanation appears to be more logica l particularly 
when it is rerneinbered that Lord Denning in Sparham-Souter 
suggested that a cause of action in tort might be ass ignable. 
2. The Nature of the Damage 
The question of whether the dicta in Anns were applicable to the 
facts of Johnson was tentatively approached by Somers and 
Cooke JJ. Anns ·decided that the cause of action would accrue only 
when the state of the building was such that there was present or 
irrrninent danger to the health and safety of the occupants. This 
conclusion was linked to the duties which the council was bound to 
discharge under the Public Health Act. Cooke and Somers JJ stated 
in deference to this conclusion in Anns that 
if (cotrary to the view that we prefer) irrrninent 
danger to personal safety were essential, t he 
separation of the outside steps from the hous e 
and the sloping of the floor would no doubt satisfy 
such a test. 39 
It is unclear from the judgments in Johnson under which statute 
the Mt. Albert Borough Council was operating when it issued the 
building permit to Sydney and subsequently inspected the adequacy 
of the foundations . It is submitted that if the purposes of the 
Act from which the council in Johnson derived its powers to issue 
building permits were similar to the purposes of the English 
Public Health Act 1936, the view that the damage had to present 
imninent danger to personal safety before the cause of action 
would accrue, would be correct. The reason is that damage causing 
irrrninent danger to the personal safety of the occupants of the 
building would then indicate a breach of the Council's statutory 
duty. 
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C. Surrrrary of the New Zealand Position Prior to Pirell i 
The Court of Appeal has approved parts only of the decis ion in 
Sparham-Souter. Clearly it has adopted the view that a plaintiff has 
not suffered damage simply from the fact that he is the owner of a 
defective property. There must · be some damage caused by the defect 
before the owner's cause of action will be complete. According to 
Bowen this will be when "actual structural damage" occurs which is 
more than minimal. According to Johnson the requisite damage will 
have occurred when "the defect becomes apparent or manifest". Both 
cases are in agreement that the damage must be observable but need not 
be actually observed before time will _begin to run under the 
Limitation Act 1950. The above formulation in Johnson seems more 
favourable to a prospective plaintiff than the formualation in Bowen. 
Under Johnson the damage, in a.ddi tion to being actual structural 
damage must indicate the existence of the defect before the cause of 
action will accrue. Under Bowen the damage need only be caused by the 
defect before time will begin to run. 
In neither case was it held (as it was in Sparham-Souter) that the 
date on which the cause of action accrued would be delayed until the 
plaintiff knew, or ought to have been aware of , the damage . 
Is there any support for Lord Denning's view that a cause of action in 
tort is assignable? Richmond Pin Bowen quoted the passage from 
Sparham-Souter where Lord Denning expressed his opinion on this point. 
Richmond P thought that even if a cause of action were assignable the 
plaintiffs' claim could be defeated on the basis that his conduct in 
buying a house with the knowledge of the defects broke the chain of 
causation. Richardson Jin Johnson indicated that an assignment of a 
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cause of action could create an exception to the general rule that a 
plaintiff may recover for the danage which has occurred during his 
ownership only. However, no suggestion was offered as to how a cause 
of action could be assigned. Thus, there was sorne support for Lord 
Denning's view that a cause of action is assignable but little help to 
determine how the assignment could be made. 
It is unclear what impact Anns has had in New Zealand in respe'ct of 
its decision that the cause of action in that case accrued when the 
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state of the building was such that there was present-' irrrninent 
danger to the health and safety of its occupants. Cooke Jin Johnson 
expressed the view that the cause of action in Johnson might have 
accrued at the time indicated by Anns but this opinion was offered as 
an alternative to the preferred view that the cause of action accrued 
when the defect became apparent or manifest. Richardson Jin Johnson 
also stopped short of deciding whether the Anns test for when the 
cause of action accrued was applicable on the facts of Johnson. 
There are however difficulties with the Court of Appeal's decision in 
Bowen, whereby a plaintiff if he discovers a defect may sue to recover 
the cost of repairing th~ defect before those expenses are actually 
incurred. The problem is that in this situation the plaintiff will . 
in theory be able to succeed in a damages claim before all the com-
ponent parts of his cause of action (no damage suffered) are present. 
Thus, there appear to be three arguments available to a plaintiff who 
wishes to sue on the basis of damage he has suffered when damage has 
already occur~ed during the ownership of his predecessor in title. 
Firstly, he may argue that the previous owner assigned the cause of 
action to him. Secondly, he may argue on the basis of the distinction 
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drawn in Bowen that the earlier darnage was rninirnal only and that 
substantial darnage occurred during his ownership only. Thirdly, he 
may argue that the later darnage was distinct from the earlier darnage 
and that accordingly a new cause of action accrued at the date of this 
later damage . However , only the second two arguments would have the 
effect of giv1ng the plaintiff more time in which to bring his action, 
as presumably if a cause of action is assigned the plaintiff will 
acquire his right of action subject to the time which has alre'ady run 
under the Limitation Act . 
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IV. Plf~~LLI GENERAL CABLE WORKS v. OSCAR FA8ER & PARTNERS 40 
A. The Decision 
The defendants, a finn of consulting engineers, negligently designed a 
chimney which was to be built at the plaintiff's works. The chimney 
was built during June and July 1969. The trial judge found that 
cracks must have occurred in the top of the chimney by April 1970. 
The plaintiffs discovered the cracks in November 1977. 
were issued in October 1978 . 
The writs 
The, trial judge held that the plaintiffs could not with reasonable 
di;igence have discovered the danage before October 1972. 
Accordingly, on the basis of Sparham-Souter he decided that the cause 
of action had accrued within the six-year limitation period. 
The sole issue contested before the House of Lords was on the qustion 
of law as to the date at which a cause of action accrued. The result 
was that the cause of action accrued when the cracks appeared in the 
top of the chimney . Thus the plaintiff's cause of action was statute-
barred as the writ had not been issued by April 1976. 
In the course of his speech Lord Fraser criticised three aspects of 
the decisio'n of the Court of Appeal in Sparham-Souter: 
(1) that there is a difference between the situation where the 
plaintiff's body, though unknown to him, has suffered some 
injury (as in Cartledge) and the situation where the 
plaintiff's house has a latent defect in the foundations 
(ii) that a cause of action accrues only when the plaintiff is or 
ought to be aware of the damage 
(iii) 
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that the earliest mornent at which time could begin to ru n 
against each successive owner of the defect ive property was 
when he bought or agreed to buy the property 
1. The Question of Damage 
Geoffrey Lane LJ thought that the distinction between a latent 
defect in a building (as in Sparham-Souter) and an unnoticed phy-
sical injury (as in Cartledge) was that 'in the former case the 
owner could resell the house at no financial loss whereas in the 
latter case he could not get rid of his body at no financial loss . 
Lord Fraser disagreed that there was such a distinction: 
Just as the owner of the house may sell the house 
before the damage is discovered, and may suffer no 
financial loss, so the man with the injured body 
may die before pneumoconiosis becomes apparent, and 
he also may suffer no financial loss. But in both 
cases they have a damaged article when, but for the 
defendant's negligence, they would have a sound one. 41 
In spite of finding that the Cartledge situation was analagous to 
the Sparham-Souter situation, Lord Fraser nevertheless decided 
that damage had not occurred before the cracks in the chimney came 
into existence. Thus the date when damage occurred was not the 
date when the chimney was negligently designed or constructed. 
Therefore the existence of the defect did not mean that damage had 
occurred. Clearly there must be some manifestation of the defect 
before damage will have occurred. In this respect at least the 
decision of the House of Lords agrees with the reasoning in 
Sparham-Souter. 
Does the reas oning in Pirelli depart from the reasoning in 
Sparham-Souter on the question of when damage will be said to have 
occurred? Lord Fraser's conclusion was that : 
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I would hold t hat t he cause of action accrued in 
spring 1970 when damage , in the form of cracKs near 
the top of the chimney, must have come into aia;•m1-..c·><,..sie:nce,, 
I avoid saying that 'cracks' appeared because that 
might seem to imply that they had been observed at 
that time. 42 
From this passage it is clear that a plaintiff's cause of action 
may arise, as it did in Pirelli, before the .damage is observed. 
But Lord Fraser went further than this and held that the 
plaintiff's cause of action may accrue before the damage i~ even 
observable. 
The plaintiff's cause of action will not accrue until 
damage occurs, which will corrrnonly consist ·of cracks 
coming into existence as a result of the defect even 
though the cracks or the defect may be undiscovered 
and undiscoverable. 43 
It is evident from the above passage that on the basis of Pirelli 
damage will be held to have occurred often well before it would be 
held to have occurred on the basis of either Sparham-Souter or 
Johnson. 
In Sparhan-Souter it was held that damage occurred when the cracks 
appeared and in Johnson the N.Z. Court of appeal preferred the 
view that damage occurred only when the defect became "apparent or 
manifest". Clearly on the basis of these two cases damage could 
not have occurred before the damage became observable. 
the cases are incompatible upon this point. 
Therefore 
Pirelli can be seen as compatible with Cartledge upon this point. 
In Cartledge it was held that damage could have occurred 
regardless of the fact that the sufferer was unaware of his 
injury. Often in cases of pneumoconiosis the disease could not 
be detected for a number of years even with the aid of x-rays. 
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Nevertheless it was held in Cartledge that darnage would have 
occurred in spite of the fact that it was even clinically unobser-
vable. 
2. When the Cause of Action Accrues 
Lord Fraser rejected the discoverability date - that is the date 
when the plaintiff ought with reasonable diligence to hav~ disco-
vered the damage - as the date when the cause of action accrued. 
He concluded that there was no support in Anns for the view that 
the discoverability date was the date on-which the cause of action 
accrued. 
It · is submitted that there has been no significant support for the 
view of Lord Denning and Geoffrey Lane LJ in Sparham-Souter that 
the cause of action could not accrue before the damage was, or 
ought to have been, discovered. The House of Lords in Anns did 
not adopt this approach, nor did the New Zealand Court of .Appeal 
in Bowen or Johnson. The House of Lords in Cartledge expressly 
rejected this approach because of the plain implications it drew 
from S.26 of the English Limitation Act of 1939. In reaching its 
conclusion the Court of Appeal in Sparham-Souter was unable to 
distinguish Cartledge satisfactorily to enable it to reach its 
contrary view. 
Thus the House of Lords in Pirelli was really only reaffirming its 
earlier view in Cartledge that the discoverability date could not 
be the date on which a cause of action accrued. 
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3. The Earliest Date of Accrual 
Lord Fraser decided that the correct view on this point was not 
that expressed by Roskill and Geoffrey Lane LJJ in Sparham-Souter 
- that is that the earliest moment at which time could begin to 
run against each successive owner was when he bought, or agreed .to 
buy, the defective property. Lord Fraser expressed his opinion as 
follows: 
I think the true view is that the duty of the builder 
and of the local authority is owed to owners of t he 
property as a class, and that if time runs against one 
owner, it also runs against all his successors in title. · 
No owner in the chain can have a better claim than his 
predecessor in title. 44 
B. Comnent 
Implicit in Lord Fraser's conclusion that time runs against not only 
the owner but also his successors in title is an acceptance by him of 
the view that a cause of action in tort is assigned upon sale of the 
property. 
Jolowicz: 
Is there any basis for this view? According to Winfield & 
It is a familiar rule in the law of assignment of chases 
in action that, while property can be lawfully a~signed 
a bare right to litigate cannot. Consistently with this, 
a right .of action in tort is not in general assignable •••• 
It is obvious that if the rule were otherwise, speculation 
in lawsuits of an undesirable kind would be encouraged. 45 
Salmond and Heuston state a number of exceptions to this general rule. 
The rule does not apply to a case in which the assignee has any 
lawful ·interest in the subject matter sufficient to exclude the doc-
tine of maintenance . 46 Cited as authority for this exception is 
Trendtex Trading v. Credit Suisse 47 where Lord Denning advocated that 
the law permit assignments of causes of action in tort provided the 
assignment is for good and sufficient consideration . 
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This helps to explain the contradictory views of t he judges in 
Sparham-Souter. Whereas Roskill and Geoffrey Lane LJJ appeared to 
favour the general rule, Lord Denning was in the process of developing 
an exception to the rule. In Trendtex Trading Lord Denning seems to 
restate the rule by altering the presumption and adding a proviso -
that the assignment must be for good and sufficient consideration. 48 
Presumably if there is not sufficient consideration - for example if 
the price of the house is reduced due to the damage - the assignment 
will be ineffective. Alternatively, where a purchaser buys a house 
at a reduced price an argument might be made that there has been an 
intervening cause , between the defendant's negligence and -the loss of 
the plaintiff. But where there is an as signment by the previous 
owner of his cause of action the argument of intervening cause could 
not deny the plaintiff a ·remedy. 
The cornnents made by Lord Denning in Trendtex Trading also explain the 
dictum of Richardson Jin Johnson. 
Allowing an assignment of a cause of action rrust provide an exception 
to the general rule that an owner may only recover for damage which 
has occurred during his ownership. But this exception must be 
justified if the reasoning in Pirelli is to be at all just. Consider 
the situation where undetected damage occurs during the ownership of A 
who then sells to Bat a price which does not take into account the 
undiscovered damage. When B discovers the damage s he ought to be 
able to recover for this loss in spite of the fact that under the 
Pirelli approach damage occurred during the ownership of A. Given 
that Pirelli rejects firstly that B's cause of action cannot have 
accrued prior to her purchas e, and secondly that B's cause of action 
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accrued when she discovered , or ought to have dis covered t he damage , 
it would be grossly unfair if she was held not to have been ass i ~ned 
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A's cause of action. 
C. Effect of Pirelli 
Pirelli has overruled the Court of Appeal decision in Sparham-Souter. 
Under Pirelli a cause of action will accrue when .damage o~curs• "which 
will comnonly consist of cracks coming into existence as a result of 
the defect even though the cracks or the defect may be undiscovered 
and undiscoverable" . 49 
It is as yet unclear what the effect of Pirell has been on the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal decisions in Bowen and Johnson. Both cas es 
offered different formulae for determining when a cause of action 
accrued . According to Bowen the cause of action will accrue when 
there is "actual structural damage which is more than minimal". The 
Court of Appeal in Johnson preferred the view that the caus e of action 
could not arise before "the defect becomes apparent or manifest". 
There are two questions which must be approached here: 
(1) Is there any way in which Pirelli might be distinguished in New 
Zealand? 
(2) Are there any ways in which a plaintiff might get around Pirelli? 
(1) Can Pirelli be distinguished? 
The Privy Council in de Lasala v de Lasala 5D decided t hat courts 
of jurisdictions which have a right of appeal to the Privy Council 
ought to cons i der thems elves bound by Hous e of Lords ' decisions 
39 
when they are considering recent legislation identical to English 
legislation with the same history. While Pirelli was concerned 
with an interpretation of the English Limitation Act 1980, its New 
Zealand counterpart (the Limitation Act 1950) is not recent 
legislation . Thus on the basis of de Lasala, New Zealand -courts 
need not consider themselves bound by Pirelli. On the other hand 
Pirelli is really concerned with determining what damage ~s suf-
ficient for the cause of action to accrue . Thus Pirelli is a 
decision on the cornnon law position rather than merely an 
interpretation of the English Limitation Act 1980. This wouid 
therefore lend support to the argument that New Zealand courts 
ought to follow Pirelli. 
Pirelli also decides that a cause of action cannot accrue on the 
discoverability date. This decision was bas?d on the contextual 
argument advanced in Cartledge that as the discoverability date 
was expressly made the date on which the cause of action accrued 
in cases of fraud only (S . 26 of the English Limitation Act 1939) 
the discoverability date could not be the date on which a cause of 
action accrued under S. 2(1) of the English Limitation Act 1939. 
Should the New Zealand courts consider themselves bound by this 
dictum in Pir e ll i ? An argument could be made that the legisla- · 
tive histories of the English Limitation Act 1980 and the New 
Zealand Limitation Act 1950 are different and accordingly the New 
Zealand courts need not follow Pirelli on this point . The argu-
ment is that there is no New Zealand equivalent of the English 
Limitation Act 1963 which altered the limitation period where per-
sonal injury was involved only . The implication which may be 
drawn is that the 1963 Act made Parliament's intention clear in 
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respect of tne appropriate limitation periods: as it left t ne 
limitation period unalt ered in respect of damage to property from 
the position laid down in Cartledge it intended that the law 
should remain unchanged in respect of property damage. As there 
is no equivalent of the English Act of 1963 it is more difficult 
to deduce exactly what Parliament's intention was in New Zealand. 
In support of an argument that the .New Zealand courts should adopt 
the discoverability date as the date on which a cause of action 
accrues in respect of damage to property is the suggestion 51 that 
at the time the Limitation Acts were passed in both England and 
New Zealand, Parliament did not consider that damage could occur 
without a reasonable opportunity of discovering that damage. 
Thus Parliament's intention is far from being as clear as was 
suggested in Cartledge, and the situation is a suitable one for the 
discoverability date to be adopted under the auspices of S .5(j) of 
the Acts Interpretation Act 1924. The lack of support for the 
discoverability date as the appropriate date for the cause of 
action to accrue in a~y of Anns, Bo~en or Johnson should not 
discourage the courts as in none of these cases did the question 
reqwire consideration. 
{2) Alternative arguments for the Plaintiff 
There appear to be two arguments available to a plaintiff who is 
confronted by a bar to his action by the Limitation Act 1950. 
Firstly, he may invoke the minimal damage/substantial damage 
distinction put forward in Bowen. It _might also be argued that 
later damage 1s distinct from earlier damage, based on Johnson 
and Bowen. If these arguments are accepted time will begin to 
4 1 
run [six years) fran the date on which the substantial d~nage or 
the distinct damage occurred. As indicated in both Bowen and 
Johnson the detennination of whether later damage is distinct from 
earlier damage is a question of fact and degree. 
Presumably the question of whether damage at one stage is minimal 
or substantial must also be a question of fact and ·degree. It is 
worthy of reminder that Richmond Pin Bowen adopted a somewhat 
flexible approach to decide whether damage fell into one or the 
other of these categories. 
It should be noted that Richardson Jin Johnson appeared to treat 
these two arguments as being merged. He observed that: 
If the later damage is treated as distinct, as I 
think it should be, there is no warrant for the view 
that more than minimal damage had occurred before the 
respondent purchased the property. 52 
But whether the two arguments are distinct or not is of no prac-
tical importance provided that the courts are prepared to 
recognise that where more serious damage similar to earlier damage 
occurs, that damage is distinct from the earlier damage. 
D. A Renaining Problem 
Assuming that Pirelli is adopted by the New Zealand ·courts, injwstice 
may arise where the damage which occurs is continuous - that is the 
state of the property becomes progressively worse as opposed to a 
deterioration by stages as there was in Johnson. Unless the courts 
adopt a liberal approach to determining when damage is substantial or 
distinct, the cause of action will accrue at the earliest date of the 
damage which may render the plaintiff's action time-barred. If a 
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lioeral approach is adopted , certainty in the law will be waived and 
litigation on questions of limitation may well increase . Clearly a 
more satisfactory approach to limitation questions would be to have it 
settled that a cause of action will accrue at the discoverability date 
- that is when the plaintiff is or ought to be aware of the damage. 
The policy underlying the Limitation Act 1950 is that plaintiffs are 
prevented from sleeping on their claims. 5J This objective coold 
still be maintained by adopting the discoverability date as the date 
on which causes of action accrue. 
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V. CUNCLUSIO~ 
It is submitted that it will not be until the matter is brought before 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal that it may be predicted with any 
degree of certainty whe½her a plaintiff ' s cause of action arising in 
circumstances described in the preceding paragraph will be time-barred 
by S . 4(1) of the Limitation Act 1950 . It is to be hoped that Pirelli 
wi l l not be followed and that the discoverability date will determine 
the date of accrual of a cause of action . 
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